

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 LUSAKA 00335 01 OF 02 041532Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
-----041538Z 058704 /42

O 041150Z FEB 77
FM AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACI IMMEDIATE 4950

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 LUSAKA 0335

NODIS

DEPT PLEASE PASS DAR, ZAMZIBAR FOR AMB YOUNG AND LONDON

DEPT MAY ALSO WISH TO PASS TO PRETORIA, CAPE TOWN, MAPUTO

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, ZA, RH
SUBJ: CONVERSATION WITH CHONA ON CONDITIONS FOR REOPENING
NEGOTIATIONS

SUMMARY: DURING LENGTHY LATE THURSDAY EVENING CONVERSATION, CHONA HANDED ME TWO LETTERS FROM PRESIDENT KAUNDA TO PRESIDENT CARTER AND SECRETARY VANCE AND AMBASSADOR KASANDA GAVE ME A THIRD FRIDAY MORNING. CHONA DESCRIBED FRONTLINE AND PATRIOTIC FRONT ANGER AT RICHARD AND WENT ON TO DISCUSS CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH HE BELIEVED THE PF WOULD AGREE TO RETURN TO A RECONSTITUTED GENEVA CONFERENCE. OTHER THAN REPLACING RICHARD AS CHAIRMAN THE CONDITIONS RESULT IN A STRENGTHENING OF PF POWER AND CONTROL AND BE EVEN MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE RHODESIANS TO ACCEPT THAN THE INITIAL BRITISH PROPOSAL. CHONA GAVE NO INDICATION THAT THE FRONTLINE WAS WILLING TO EXERT INFLUENCE ON NATIONALISTS TO MODERATE THEIR DEMANDS IN ORDER TO DEVELOP A PROPOSAL ACCEPTABLE TO ALL SIDES. THE ZAMBIA APPEAR DETERMINED TO FOLLOW A TWO-PRONGED POLICY OF SEEKING SOCIALIST HELP FOR THE ARMED STRUGGLE AND WESTERN ASSISTANCE IN A NEGOTIATING EFFORT BOTH DESIGNED TO BRING PRESSURE ON SMITH AND ENABLE THE SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 LUSAKA 00335 01 OF 02 041532Z

PF TO TAKE POWER IN RHODESIA. END SUMMARY.

1. MARK CHONA ASKED ME TO COME TO HIS HOUSE LATE THURSDAY EVENING AND WE TALKED FOR ABOUT TWO HOURS. DURING THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSION TWO LETTERS WERE DELIVERED TO THE HOUSE WHICH HE GAVE ME: FROM PRESIDENT KAUNDA TO PRESIDENT CARTER AND SECRETARY VANCE. A THIRD LETTER WHICH SETS OUT THE ZAMBIA

POSITION IN GREATER DETAIL ADDRESSED TO PRESIDENT CARTER WAS
DELIVERED ON FRIDAY MORNING.

2. CHONA BEGAN BY EXPRESSING HIS PLEASURE AND SATISFACTION OVER
HIS RECENT VISIT TO WASHINGTON. HIS PURPOSE HAD BEEN TO ASSURE
HIMSELF THAT THE NEW ADMINISTRATION INTENDED TO PRESERVE AND
MOVE FORWARD FROM THE KISSINGER POSITION AS STATED IN THE
APRIL LUSAKA SPEECH. HE CAME AWAY CONVINCED THAT THIS WAS INDEED
ITS INTENTION.

3. CHONA THANKED ME FOR SENDING HIM AND THE PRESIDENT THE
ADVANCE TEXT OF SECRETARY VANCE'S PRESS CONFERENCE STATEMENT
ON RHODESIA. HE ASKED TO BE SURE THAT IT WAS ALSO SENT TO MAPUTO
AND DAR AND SAID HE THOUGHT IT WAS A MOST HELPFUL STATEMENT --
AS THE PRESIDENT SAYS IN HIS LETTER.

4. CHONA THEN TURNED TO THE RECENT DISPUTE WITH RICHARD.
HE SAID HE HAD WANTED TO TALK TO ME TUESDAY FOLLOWING PRES
KAUNDA'S MEETING WITH RICHARD BUT HAD BEEN UNABLE TO. RICHARD,
HE SAID, HAD MADE EVERYONE ANGRY. HIS FIRST MISTAKE WAS HIS
FAILURE ON JAN 10 TO PRESENT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WITH A WRITTEN
STATEMENT OF THE BRITISH PROPOSAL (THOUGH HE ADMITTED HE HAS
SUBSEQUENTLY LEARNED THAT IT WAS NOT RICHARD'S FAULT BUT A
POSITION TAKEN BY THE BRITISH CABINET). RICHARD COMPOUNDED THE
ERROR BY INSISTING THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT GIVE HIM A REPLY ON
THE SPOT. THIS IS WHAT LED IT TO GO BACK TO ITS INSISTENCE ON
ITS ORIGINAL PROPOSALS GIVEN HIM IN GENEVA. AS FAR AS THE
DISCUSSION ON JAN 31 WAS CONCERNED, THE THING THAT HAD SET
PRES KAUNDA OFF WAS RICHARD'S CONTENTION THAT HE HAD NOT ANNOUNCED
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 LUSAKA 00335 01 OF 02 041532Z

THE END OF THE GENEVA DISCUSSION BY HIS STATEMENT IN SALISBURY.
HIS GREATEST ERROR, HOWEVER, WAS THE UNILATERAL ANNOUNCEMENT
THAT HE SAW NO POINT IN RECONVENING THE GENEVA CONFERENCE.
ACCORDING TO CHONA, THOUGH IT MAY NOT BE ENTIRELY RICHARD'S
FAULT, THE FACT IS HE HAS THOROUGHLY ANTAGONIZED EVERYONE.

5. CHONA THEN TURNED THE REST OF THE CONVERSATION TO THE
CONDITIONS NECESSARY TO RECONVENE THE GENEVA CONFERENCE. HE
SAID HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE BRITISH LED HIM TO BELIEVE IT
WOULD TAKE ABOUT A MONTH TO PREPARE FOR RECONVENING THE GENEVA
CONFERENCE. PRES KAUNDA COULD NOT ASK THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO GO
BACK TO GENEVA WITHOUT MORE ASSURANCES THAN THEY HAD BEFORE.
IN THE FIRST PLACE, IT WAS QUITE CLEAR THAT RICHARD WOULD NOT
CONTINUE TO CHAIR THE CONFERENCE. HE WOULD HAVE TO BE REPLACED
BY SOMEONE OF MINISTERIAL LEVEL, PRESUMABLY CROSSTON. THE PATRIOTIC
FRONT HAD RESERVED ITS POSITION BEFORE ON THIS POINT BUT IT
WAS NOT PREPARED TO DO SO AGAIN. BRITAIN HAD NOW COMMITTED
ITSELF TO PLAY A ROLE IN RHODESIA AND A MERE AMBASSADOR WAS
NO LONGER ADEQUATE TO COMMIT IT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AHEAD.

THE U.S. MUST ALSO TAKE A MORE PROMINENT PART IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THEY WERE TOO IMPORTANT TO ENTRUST TO A NATION WHICH CHANGED ITS POSITION SO FREQUENTLY AND FEARED TO SEND ITS MINISTERS OUT OF THE COUNTRY BECAUSE ITS MAJORITY WAS NOT STRONG ENOUGH IN PARLIAMENT. IN THE FIRST INSTANCE THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE CARRIED ON WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. THERE MAY STILL BE A ROLE FOR MUZOREWA BUT THERE CERTAINLY WASN'T ONE FOR SITHOLE. ONE COULD NOT TAKE THE LATTER SERIOUSLY ANY MORE WHEN HE HAD NO PLACE TO GO. HE COULDN'T RETURN TO RHODESIA, ZAMBIA, OR MOZAMBIQUE. NEXT CHONA FELT THE BRITISH PROPOSALS SHOULD BE REDRAFTED. THEY WERE PUT TOGETHER HURRIEDLY AND HAD MUCH THAT WAS LOOSELY DRAFTED OR UNCLEAR. IN PARTICULAR, HE FELT THAT THE

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 LUSAKA 00335 02 OF 02 041519Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
-----041522Z 058513 /42
O 041150Z FEB 77
FM AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4951

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 LUSAKA 0335

NODIS

ORGANIZATION OF NATIONALIST PARTICIPATION IN THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE LEFT TO THE NATIONALISTS. THEY WILL DECIDE WHO IS TO BE PRIME MINISTER AND HOW TO DIVIDE UP THE 20 MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS ASSIGNED TO THEM. IT WAS NOT UP TO THE BRITISH TO ALLOCATE THIS MEMBERSHIP AMONG THE NATIONALIST ORGANIZATIONS. THESE CONDITIONS WILL BE SPELLED OUT IN SOME DETAIL IN PRES KAUNDA'S LETTER. AFTER A FIRM UNDERSTANDING HAD BEEN NEGOTIATED IN GENEVA WITH THE NATIONALISTS IT WOULD THEN BE PRESENTED TO SMITH OR VORSTER ON A TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT BASIS.

4. I ASKED CHONA HOW HE THOUGHT WE COULD GET RHODESIAN ACCEPTANCE OF THESE PROPOSALS WHEN THEY HAD ALREADY REJECTED OUT OF HAND A MUCH MORE SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENT FROM THEIR POINT OF VIEW. HE UNDERSTOOD THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICAL SITUATION BETTER THAN I AND SURELY KNEW THAT THE FRONTLINE'S EXCLUSIVE RECOGNITION OF THE PF COMPLICATED THE SITUATION IN TERMS OF GETTING SOUTH AFRICAN SUPPORT. CHONA SAID THAT THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR HAD TOLD

HIM THAT IF THE U.S. AND BRITIAN WERE REALLY WORRIED ABOUT MARXIST INFLUENCE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA ALL THEY HAD TO DO TO STOP IT WAS GET RID OF SMITH. HE ADDED THAT HE COULDNT UNDERSTAND THE SOUTH AFRICANS' ATTITUDE TOWARD MUGABE. THE U.S. WOULD HAVE TO HELP CONVINCE THEM THAT HE WAS NOT A MARXIST. I SAID THAT MUGABE HAD NOT HELPED US MUCH WITH THIS TASK IN THE STATEMENTS HE HAS BEEN MAKING. CHONA REPLIED THAT HE HAD TAKEN THESE KINDS OF POSITIONS IN ORDER NOT TO BE OUTFLANKED

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 LUSAKA 00335 02 OF 02 041519Z

BY SITHOLE. I SAID SITHOLE'S STATEMENTS HAD NOT BEEN OF SUCH A RADICAL NATURE. IN ANY CASE, CHONA SAID, THE U.S. WOULD HAVE TO EXPLAIN THE SITUATION TO SMITH AND VORSTER AND IF THEY WOULD NOT ACCEPT IT THEN THE U.S. ANSWER WAS SIMPLE -- AN OIL EMBARGO. THAT WOULD BRING THEM AROUND QUICKLY. I SAID THIS WAS A COMPLICATED SUBJECT WHICH PRESENTED US WITH MANY DIFFICULT LEGAL PROBLEMS. I UNDERSTOOD THAT THE ACCUSATIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE ARE UNDER INVESTIGATION.

5. CHONA AND PRESIDENT KAUNDA ARE LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING AMBASSADOR YOUNG IN DAR WHICH THEY PRESUME WILL BE SATURDAY MORNING. THEY WILL UNDOUBTEDLY TAKE A LINE SIMILAR TO THE ONE ABOVE AND CONTAINED IN THE LETTER FROM PRESIDENT KAUNDA.

COMMENT: I FOUND THE DISCUSSION VERY DISCOURAGING. CHONA AND PRES KAUNDA HAVE APPARENTLY PROFITED NOT AT ALL FROM THE GENEVA FAILURE TO WHICH THEY CONTRIBUTED BY NOT PRESSING THE NATIONALISTS TO ADOPT MORE MODERATE POSITIONS. THE TWO-PRONGED STRATEGY WHICH THEY ARE DEVELOPING IS FAIRLY EVIDENT. THEY WILL USE THE SOVIETS AND SOCIALIST COUNTRIES TO HELP THEM BRING PRESSURE ON SMITH THROUGH THE ARMS STRUGGLE AND THE U.S., BRITAIN, AND THE WEST TO BRING PRESSURE ON SMITH THROUGH NEGOTIATING PATH AT GENEVA. THE WESTERN DESIRE FOR RACIAL JUSTICE AND A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT AND PARTICULARLY COMPETITION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST FOR INFLUENCE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA WILL LEAD THE TWO SIDES TO TRY TO OUT DO EACH OTHER IN BRINGING PRESSURE ON SMITH. ZAMBIA AND THE FRONTLINE NEED ONLY STAND ASIDE AND WAIT FOR SMITH'S FALL. THE ONLY PRESSURE WHICH THE FRONTLINE IS PREPARED TO BRING IS TO KEEP THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TOGETHER AND MUZOREWA AND SITHOLE IN A SUBSIDIARY ROLE. IN THESE TWO EFFORTS THEY ARE WILLING TO BE FIRM. IT ALSO APPEARS THAT, AS NKOMO TOLD AN ACQUAINTANCE YESTERDAY, (LUSAKA 0330), THE PATRIOTIC FRONT (AND THE FRONTLINE) IS NOW SEEKING A SOLUTION WHICH ASSURES ITS POWER AND CONTROL -- AS WAS THE CASE WITH FRELIMO IN MOZAMBIQUE.

SO FAR AS ZAMBIA IS CONCERNED, NKOMO'S LEADING POSITION

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 LUSAKA 00335 02 OF 02 041519Z

APPEARS TO BE ENOUGH TO ASSURE IT THAT ITS INTERESTS WILL BE PROTECTED. IT WILL USE WHAT IT PERCEIVES TO BE THE U.S. DESIRE FOR NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT TO KEEP THE SOVIETS OUT, AND OBTAIN ITS OWN GOALS IN ZIMBABWE. LOW

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptoning: X
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, INTERIM GOVERNMENT, INDEPENDENCE, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, NATIONALISTS, NEGOTIATIONS, CAT-B
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 04-Feb-1977 12:00:00 am
Decapton Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decapton Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977LUSAKA00335
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: P840072-2429, N770001-0412
Format: TEL
From: LUSAKA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770272/aaaacmah.tel
Line Count: 230
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: fdcf97cb-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 09-Feb-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3408222
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CONVERSATION WITH CHONA ON CONDITIONS FOR REOPENING NEGOTIAIONS
TAGS: PFOR, PDEV, RH, ZA, US, UK, (CARTER, JIMMY), (VANCE, CYRUS R), (CHONA, MARK), (RICHARD, IVOR), (KAUNDA, KENNETH DAVID)
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/fdcf97cb-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009